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From Social Welfare to Welfare Society:  
A Humane World Beyond Social Welfare? 
  
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
 
In the 1980's, the relationship of social welfare activities to the future has been 
dramatically altered. Until the conservative ascendency of the Reagan 
government, the future of social welfare was defined largely in terms of the 
incremental welfare state, characterized by gradual expansion of tax-
supported programs and benefits,  with periodic policy refinements and 
extensions of benefits and coverages to new populations. Since 1980, all sorts 
of  "doom and gloom" has been spread--mostly linked to short-term 
developments. This paper is an effort to propose a moderately optimistic 
alternative future for one segment of the social welfare system--personal care 
services. In this future, the main burden of personal care services will be borne 
by the private sector. Dramatic improvements in the financing and marketing 
of human services will be called for, including expanded private practice, 
technology-intensive services and new forms of private insurance. 
	
Introduction 
Although Reagan Administration officials and others talk a great deal 
about what has come to be called “privatization”, one suspects that they have 
neither thought very deeply nor very clearly about the implications of this 
approach, and that such talk is actually only a smoke-screen for budget-
cutting initiatives aimed primarily at reducing the federal role in the 
economy. The term “social welfare” is used in this article to refer to the full 
range of publicly funded  and societally sanctioned systems for providing 
health, educational, manpower, housing, income maintenance and personal 
care services. The term	services	is	used	to	mean	“any	act	of	an	individual	in	so	far	
as	it	contributes	to	the	realization	of	the	ends	of	other	individuals”	(Parsons,	1935).	
This includes services delivered  by federal, state and local governments as 
well as services purchased with public funds from commercial and nonprofit 
vendors.  
_______________ 
 *An earlier version of this paper was presented at "On the Way to 2019: The Human Future 
in a Brave New World."  University of Akron. February 9, 1986. 
We shall set aside any systematic concerns for social insurance, public 
assistance, unemployment, housing, and the main body of education and 
health care issues in this paper and concentrate solely upon personal care 
services. “Personal care service” is emerging as an umbrella term for the 
central preoccupations of the social work profession, including mental health, 
counseling and therapeutic services, and long-term residential or home-based 
care for the elderly, retarded, chronically mentally ill, dependent, orphaned 
and abused children, and others in need of primary assistance with the 
activities of daily living (Morris, 1983; Kamerman and Kahn, 1976). 
An important underlying policy issue in personal care that emerged as a 
result of the Reagan government efforts to trim federal social spending is the 
fiscal basis for a true national system of adequate personal care. With certain 
notable exceptions, such as infant day care, there are remarkably few 
partisan political controversies over policy in this area. Indeed, one of the 
main features of the bi-partisan incremental strategy for personal care as it 
has emerged is the view that these are largely issues between the informed 
and the indifferent and unaware.  
The greatest controversy arises over the question of the fiscal basis of 
personal care services (or, who shall pay for personal care). It has been an 
unwavering premise of the past two decades that support for personal care is, 
ultimately, a societal, and therefore, a federal responsibility. Such a premise 
is consistent with large public expenditures, and at obvious loggerheads with 
Reagan-era efforts to trim federal spending. Continued support for this view 
in the face of obvious, indeed, overwhelming political opposition has produced 
a sense of stalemate and defeatism in large parts of the leadership of the 
personal care system today. 
The Past As Prologue 
During the 1980's, the relationship toward the future of the entire range 
of social welfare activities in the United States has been dramatically altered. 
Until the ascendency of the conservative Reagan government in the United 
States in 1981, the future as it related to social welfare was defined largely in 
terms of an incremental welfare state, characterized by gradual expansion of 
tax supported programs and benefits, with periodic policy refinements and 
extensions of benefits and coverages to new populations.  
The incremental nature of policy debate largely removed any necessity for 
long-range or visionary glimpses of the future. "The future" was simply the 
period in which improvements to the system already anticipated or projected 
would be realized. The curiously calm and unperturbed reactions within the 
social welfare community to dramatic events such as the 1981 Budget 
Reconciliation Act and the 1985 Graham-Rudman Act are perhaps best 
understood as testaments to the continued influence of this viewpoint;  
Things might not look too good at any given moment, but they will right 
themselves again very soon in an upcoming session of Congress or 
Presidential election. The social welfare future was,  if not always rosy, at 
least basically optimistic and stretched toward distant, if indefinite, horizons 
of universal eligibility, comprehensive program coverage and eventual 
elimination of human need. Past and future melt into one continuous, 
cumulative and apolitical realization of needs-to-be-met. 
A primary source for such optimism has been heavy reliance on the 
functionalist theory of modernization which sets forth a "replacement thesis", 
in which formal, organized personal care bureaucracies are said to be taking 
over caring functions previously performed by the family and community in a 
more or less automatic and apolitical manner. (Wilensky and LeBeaux, 1965; 
Zastrow, 1985)  In this view, the gradual unfolding of the American welfare 
state is understood as a more or less automatic and irresistible consequence 
of modernization, unaffected by organizational or political agendas. Any 
possibility that in the future such caring functions might simply be neglected 
or abandoned receives scant consideration. This consistently optimistic model 
of ineluctable evolutionary progress has remained remarkably intact from  
the Progressive Era into the present among liberal and progressive social 
scientists, bureaucrats and social reformers. Since the Great Depression it 
has hardened into ideology, even though the system it legitimates is still only 
partially realized.  
The main dynamics of American social welfare consisted of annual budget 
increments, almost-annual "technical" amendments to the Social Security Act 
(such as the addition of Medical Assistance for the Aged in 1959, Social 
Services in 1962, and the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972) 
and periodic enactments of new programs  which quickly fall into the familiar 
patterns of similar annual budget increments and program "tinkering". A 
kind of mild, evolutionary Fabian or community socialism until the fifties, 
"social welfare" ideology over the past thirty years has been cast as an "end of 
ideology": objective, scientific, professional and politically neutral. The 
existing personal care system in the United States came into being almost 
entirely within the dominant assumptions of the reluctant welfare state: A 
series of amendments to the Social Security act legitimated a "service 
strategy" approach to poverty,  purchase of service agreements with private 
service providers, various "demonstration" programs and a host of other 
refinements.  
The voluntary sector, which is sometimes cast as a social laboratory for 
new programs,  has became the increasing recipient of public “demonstration” 
funds aiding and abetting new discoveries, and more recently has emerged as 
a semi-public conveyor of public purpose through  purchase of service 
agreements. Some sources have estimated that as much as 85% of all 
voluntary sector social welfare activity is, in fact, publicly subsidized. 
Beginning in the 1960's, congressional bi-partisanship and bureaucratic 
commitment to gradualism were repeatedly mistaken for an evolution beyond 
politics to professionalism. Gradual continued growth of personal care and 
other elements of the social welfare system was virtually assured by a kind of 
pincer movement of the combined efforts of Democratic liberals in Congress 
and politically neutral professionals in the federal bureaucracy. (Stern, 1981)   
The most significant aspect of the Reagan years for personal care is not 
budget-cutting. It is that the underlying system of  political support  for the 
main line of financial support for the social welfare system is no longer 
viable. Although the apolitical professionals are still there, the Congressional 
liberals and key federal bureaucratic leaders have been replaced everywhere 
by fiscal conservatives. As a result, the growth of public spending for personal 
care has been slowed, and in some cases dramatically reversed. (Stern, 1981; 
Markson, 1985)  Even more importantly, the dynamic of incremental change 
that has been so important in American history (Lindblom, 1965) now 
promises only continued erosion of federal personal care services funding for 
years to come. 
The Present State of Futurelessness 
Even though political and institutional circumstances have changed, the 
sense of the future in social welfare has not. Since 1980, social workers, 
liberal social scientists and public administrators and the few left-of-center 
politicians remaining in elective office in the United States have 
demonstrated a consistent, marked inability to visualize the future except as 
a restoration of old familiar dreams. Since such restorations seems unlikely 
in the foreseeable future, the predominant outlook in social work today might 
be described as futurelessness.  
To be sure, among academic and intellectual audiences, one can find some 
variant futures being discussed:  For example, there is the “basic goodness of 
the people” argument:  The Reagan Administration, it is said, is  ill-informed, 
insensitive, unresponsive to human needs and unrepresentative of the true 
nature of American public opinion and it is only a matter of time before the 
people realize this. Related to this is the “catastrophe syndrome” argument in 
which it is seen as only a matter of time before Reagan policies bring on an 
economic collapse on the scale of the Great Depression. At this time, a neo-
Roosevelt will emerge and initiate a Neo Deal and happy days will return 
again! A particular favorite in some circles is the “pendulum thesis” which 
argues that American public opinion swings back and forth regularly between 
conservative and liberal views on taxation and public spending, and any day 
now, one can expect the swing leftward toward support for greater public 
spending. All of these various scenarios share the view that social welfare is 
socially self-evident, politically neutral and historically inevitable and that 
society's humanitarian interests can only be protected by statist action. A 
somewhat less benign variant on the same thesis is the “collapse of 
capitalism” argument in which the welfare state is seen as merely a 
temporary propping up of capitalism, and conservatives who have been 
foolish (and greedy) enough to sweep it away will bring down capitalism as 
well. Thus, the present crisis in social welfare, it is said, is only a part of the 
working-through of the death-throes of capitalism and it is only a matter of 
time before the entire system collapses.  
All of these views share the implicit assumption of the inevitability of  
state action. Further, they share the implicit assumption that the political 
and economic similarities of late industrial capitalism override any 
differences in culture and history. Thus, the United States today was viewed 
as a reluctant, underdeveloped, regressive and lagging welfare state even 
before the Reagan years.  
Assumptions 
It is possible to construct a dramatically different view of the future 
without being either a Reagan Administration apologist or a political 
conservative. (Indeed, several decentralized socialist variants on this 
argument may be worth exploring). Four alternative assumptions undergird 
this view: 
1) The Reagan Administration is the product of a permanent 
realignment in the American political system.  
2) Opposition to high taxes and big government are permanent features 
of American political life.  
3) American political culture is different from Western European 
culture, and the shared circumstances of industrialism have 
diminished, but not eliminated key differences.  
4) And, most importantly, concern for human well-being is not the sole 
purview of the nation-state but is widely diffused among American 
social institutions.  
None of these assumptions is particularly original or novel. They have just 
been ignored or shoved aside by welfare proponents. It has been over a 
decade since Kevin Phillips and others began identifying “the New 
Republican Majority” arguments associated with population shifts and other 
factors (Phillips, 1970). In the late 1950's, J.K. Galbraith presented his 
famous “poverty of the public sector” claim as a paradoxical implication of an 
affluent society suspicious of strong government (Galbraith, 1958). In the 
1960's and later Richard Titmuss wrote of the emergence of “fiscal, 
occupational and social welfare” institutions, and Wilensky and LeBeaux 
noted a trend toward an eventual "welfare society" (Titmuss, 1968; Titmuss, 
1976;  Wilensky and LeBeaux, 1965). And social commentators as diverse as 
Marx, Engels, DeTocqueville, Henry James and Mark Twain have 
commented upon the differences between European and American society. 
Indeed, the tendency to overlook such differences has been a rather recent 
tendency largely restricted to liberal political scientists and might be 
arguable viewed as more wish than reality.  
Welfare Society: An Alternative Future 
My purpose here is to set forth an alternative conception of a future not 
grounded in large public expenditures for human services. The welfare 
society argument need not posit a social world entirely without public sector 
involvement. Even extreme conservative and libertarian views typically find 
a limited social welfare role for the state, usually in terms of protection of 
property or basic rights and using terms like “the nightwatchman state” 
(Nozick, 1974; Friedmann, 1962).   
Government in a future American welfare society might assume four 
roles:  Two of these seem most appropriate for the federal government: 1) 
Assuring justice for all citizens (Rawls, 1970; Nozick, 1974; Dworkin, 1978).  
Justice here should be – ala Rawls – defined broadly to include basic income 
maintenance efforts for the elderly, poor and unemployed and not be 
restricted to the property rights of particular classes. 2) A source for "venture 
capital" for innovative "social experimentation" efforts (such as the Space 
program, the elimination of diseases like polio, small pox and measles, and 
deinstitutionalization). Where the risks are too high and/or the payoffs too 
low for other social institutions to undertake the efforts there is a clear role 
for federal action. Once the viability of services initiated under such a 
strategy has been demonstrated (as in the cases of Senior Centers, 
Community Mental Health Centers, Home Health, etc.) federal support 
should be withdrawn, and private action (whether profit-oriented or 
nonprofit) can take over. In addition, the traditional police powers of 
American state governments should continue to address their particular 
attentions to regulation of individual behavior (e.g., domestic violence) and 
services, as they currently do in the regulation of professions, health, day 
care services and nursing home facilities. Under this scenario, the main 
burden of future personal care services will be borne by the private sectors at 
the community level, with dramatic improvements in the financing, 
marketing and delivery of services called for. 
The most critical of the necessary innovations is to locate a set of fiscal 
institutions to replace the dwindling federal general revenue funds. In a 
society as rich as ours, this is not really a question of whether such funding 
can be found, but how to find and harness it. It seems highly likely that a 
broad continuum of community fiscal institutions is already emerging to 
support local activity. This continuum will undoubtedly include 
independently funded and privately endowed agencies and those funded by 
coordinated multi-agency campaigns like United Way. There will also be 
significant growth of fee-for-service programs, including numerous forms of 
private practice by solo, group partnership and professional corporation 
bases. Free-standing social work practices may variously be organized as 
nonprofit or for-profit ventures, depending upon capitalization, tax position, 
market position and other variables. A dramatically expanded “independent 
sector” including private philanthropy by general, family, corporate and 
community foundations and dramatically expanded volunteer opportunities, 
mutual aid and self-help networks are all plausible possibilities (Corneulle, 
1965).  
Health maintenance organizations (HMO's) have made dramatic inroads 
in various communities with their combination insurance-service delivery 
packages and unique reversal of the inherent bias of fee-for-service against 
prevention. Social/health maintenance organizations (SHMO) may, in future, 
offer similar opportunities for non-health related social services. The issue 
here is not just the application of the insurance principle to the funding of 
non-medical human services, but also the range of problems to which the 
principle is applied. It would appear, for example, that many of the problems 
of financial community services could be approached as problems in 
insurance – that is, matters of pooled risk. For example, limited forms of 
Long-Term Care insurance for the elderly and victims of chronic disease are 
already becoming available. Extension of such coverages to day care, 
homemaker services, home health care, home delivered meals, hospice, etc. 
could be straightforward. Likewise, insurance coverage to various categories 
of urban and domestic violence may be amenable to insurance solutions, 
(with or without SHMO's) as might various other categories of victimage; for 
example,  mental health services in post-disaster communities. There will 
always be a threshold below which some portion of poor persons will be 
unable to afford privately delivered community services. The values of social 
work have always strained toward universal availability. The main corps of 
voluntary services have attempted to deal with this problem for the past half-
century through the device of “sliding scale” fees which means, in essence, 
forms of service subsidized by third parties.  
A number of interesting long-range future possibilities have arisen 
recently from an entirely new quarter – the prospects of cost-reduction 
through more technology-intensive service delivery. In this area, the question 
of whether computers can do social work may be wide of the mark. The real 
issue may be which aspects of social work can be done more effectively and at 
lower cost in this way? In particular, the use of electronic computing 
equipment to gather, collate, store and manipulate information seem to be 
substantial. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined aspects of the possible transition from a 
view of the future through the lens of the welfare state to the view of a broad-
scale welfare society in which all major social institutions have some aspect 
of responsibility for human well-being.  
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